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2. Abstract - Operational Risk Management Framework at BNP Paribas 
The scope of this empirical study was developed within the NOVA SBE Work Project Direct 
Internship Programme, involving the analysis of selected processes entailed by the ORM 
framework at BNP Paribas. Operational Risk will constantly threaten to subvert financial 
institutions, hence regulators require banks to have effective Operational Risk Management (ORM) 
systems, so that potentially significant risks are detected and mitigated at the earliest, to safeguard 
stakeholders’ interests (McKinsey 2016). This work project researches the relevance of the ORM 
model of BNP Paribas Global Markets department by examining the processes and their associated 
risks. By studying the operational risk trends from past incidents to identify, evaluate, and measure 
operational risks existence, a risk map is determined and an internal control system designed, to 
mitigate, evade or diminish the impact of the identified risks, thereby closing the gap to avoid 
similar incidents from occurring in future. Operational risk incidents highlight that standardized 
and structural drivers within institutions allow these events to occur and hence this empirical study 
elucidates that the development and implementation of an ORM framework to curtail financial 
impact and protect the bank’s reputation is crucial and essential. 
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3. Abbreviations 
• ORM- Operational Risk Management 
• CIB- Client and Institutional Banking  
• GM FO- Global Markets Front Office  
• GBL- Global Business Line 
4. Introduction 
The stability of a financial institution is consistently threatened by a tenacious impediment called 
‘Risk’ (ECB, 2017), which emerges in various forms including credit, liquidity, operational, 
market, to strongly undermine the ability of a financial institution to progress economically and for 
financial institutions to manoeuvre through volatile and potentially hazardous risks, development 
of systems and capital and liquidity buffers to provide protection against unanticipated losses is 
essential (BIS, 2000, ECB, 2015). In 2014, BNP Paribas, was levied a US$8.97 bn fine for 
deliberately masking forbidden transactions through the US financial system for entities subject to 
U.S. economic sanctions (Kittrie, 2016). In 2012, Barclays plc admitted to manipulating LIBOR—
a benchmark interest rate that is fundamental to the operation of international financial markets and 
was fined US$450 mn to U.K. and U.S. regulators (HBS, 2014). In 2012 again, Standard Chartered 
was also fined US$340 mn by the New York State Department of Financial Services over 
allegations that it flouted US anti-money-laundering sanctions with Iran (Forbes, 2012). These 
operational risk cases in banks proved to be costly. These cases portray the need for banks to 
espouse practices, internal controls, behaviours, and governance mechanisms that prevent or 
diminish impending risks from having calamitous consequences (EBA, 2010; BIS, 2015). Due to 
the large size and complexity of BNP Paribas’s systems, processes, regulatory environment, and 
nationalities, financial stability is a major concern for regulators. For this work project, I will be 
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addressing the gaps identified by the bank in Portugal from past incidents relating to trading and  
structuring teams worldwide and developing business solutions in the form of control plans to close 
these gaps. 
5. Literature Review 
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) established the Basel framework after the 
1970’s international financial upheaval caused by the collapse of the Bretton Woods system 
causing several banks to shut down due to incurring cumbersome foreign currency losses (BCBS, 
2015). Therefore, the central bank Governors of the Group of Ten countries established the BCBS 
in 1974 to enhance financial stability by improving the quality of banking supervision worldwide, 
and to serve as a medium for regular cooperation between its member countries on banking 
supervisory matters (BCBS, 2015). The BCBS is the primary global standard setter for the 
prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on banking supervisory 
matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the regulation, supervision, and practices of banks worldwide 
with the purpose of enhancing financial stability. The BCBS does not possess any formal 
supranational authority and its decisions do not have legal force (BCBS, 2017; IFRS, 2017). 
Operational risk incidents at Barings Bank, UBS and Société Générale caused enormous losses due 
to the illicit activities of a sole traders. However, the actual issue was inadequate management of 
operational risk and hence the BCBS highlights the need for banks to constantly address, the risk 
of losses arising due to lack of people management. (BCBS, 2001). 
Nick Leeson’s undetected risky trades accumulated to losses of US $1 bn ultimately causing the 
bankruptcy of Barings Bank due to its loosely cohering management structure and hence besides 
acknowledging Leeson as the sole perpetrator of the fraud, the Bank of England also emphasized 
on the “serious failure of controls and managerial confusion within Barings” (Hoch et al., 2001).  
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Also, the rogue trading activities of Jerome Kerviel cost Société Générale, €4.6bn in financial 
losses in 2008, and Kweku Adoboli cost UBS US$2.3bn in financial losses in 2011 (Gilligan, 
2011). However operational risk is not subject to the actions of a sole culprit but could also occur 
due to comprehensive misconducts depending on the environment in which it is embedded on a 
daily basis (Deloitte, 2017). This is portrayed in the LIBOR manipulation scandal where mass scale 
duplicitous actions occurred due to a non-existent or feeble ORM systems. The lack of judicious, 
ethical, and transparent management systems for estimating the rates highlights a major operational 
risk vulnerability of the LIBOR scandal (McConnell, 2013). These cases demonstrate the impact 
an ineffective or non-existent ORM system has on financial institutions, thus emphasizing that it 
is important to implement effective ORM systems for the protection of financial institutions, and 
the markets, from the negative impacts by operational risk. 
5.1. Operational Risk 
Operational risk is defined by the BCBS as “the risk of loss resulting from inadequate or failed 
internal processes, people and systems or from external events. This definition includes legal risk, 
but excludes strategic and reputational risk” (BCBS, 2001). Hence, rendering to the definition, the 
probable origins of operational risk are people, processes, systems, and external events. The BCBS 
recognizes that operational risk has a variety of meanings and therefore, for internal purposes, 
banks are permitted to adopt their own definitions of operational risk, provided that the minimum 
elements in the Committee's definition are included (Bodur, 2012). More recently, the operational 
risk was defined as “the risk of loss from an operational failure. It encompasses a wide range of 
events and actions as well as inactions, e.g., the failure to take appropriate action in a timely 
manner. When operational failures result in losses they are referred to as operational loss events. 
These losses include events ranging from unintentional execution errors, system failures and acts 
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of nature to conscious violations of law and regulation as well as direct and indirect acts of 
excessive risk taking” (Op Risk Advisory & Towers Perrin, 2010). 
The term “operational risk” became prominent in recent years as it continuously evolves, occurring 
in different types even though, operational risk is the oldest risk faced by banks and other financial 
institutions (Bodur, 2012). EU legislation requires banks to adequately manage and mitigate 
operational risk, as it is embedded in all banking products and activities. It has always existed in 
banking, and other organizations but it has acquired a greater relevance given the increased 
complexity of products, methods and technology used in international financial markets and 
globalization of financial system and the recent materialization of unprecedented large losses (EBA 
2016, 2017). In Portugal, banks need to establish and implement policies and procedures to assess 
and manage operational risk by defining the notion of operational risk, including events of reduced 
frequency but of great impact (BdP, 1992). 
The goal of an ORM framework is identifying malfunctions and/or risks that entities are exposed 
to, thus preventing their occurrence, or repressing the financial implications and hence regulators 
require a declaration regarding all substantial operational incidents from banks, to ensure that the 
required capital is reserved for catastrophic operational risk scenarios (BCBS, 2011). This is 
illustrated in the case of Nordea, a Swedish Group that had to increase their reserve requirements 
substantially due to inadequate second line of defence controls, its involvement in the governance 
of the IRB system and modelling which also included an add-on for operational risk from 
inspections relating to IT and key processes (Nordea, 2015). Operational Risk is one of the 
important arms of the risk management triangle -the other two being Credit Risk and Market 
(Treasury) Risk. Any organization, particularly in the banking sector, is squarely exposed to 
operational risks emanating within or outside the organization. Operational Risk is also known as 
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Transaction Risk in some countries to efficiently face this new challenge in risk management, the 
prerequisites are -creation of risk culture and enterprise wide operational risk awareness. Proactive 
steps at all the levels of operation will operate as a safety value and in the process, may facilitate 
lower risk capital charge. 
The BCBS demarcated seven Level 1 event types of incidents for calculating operational risk, 
however banks could implement an internal sub-level if necessary. (BCBS, 2002). As described by 
BCBS and Shevchenko in 2011 the level 1 event types are: 
# Event type Definition 
1. Internal fraud Losses due to acts intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or circumvent 
regulations, the law or company policy by an internal party 
2. External fraud Losses due to acts of a type intended to defraud, misappropriate property, or 
circumvent the law by a third party 
3. Employment practices & 
workplace safety 
Losses arising from acts inconsistent with employment, health or safety laws 
or agreements, from payment of personal injury claims, or from diversity / 
discrimination events 
4. Clients, Products & Business 
Practices 
Losses arising from an unintentional or negligent failure to meet a professional 
obligation to specific clients (including fiduciary and suitability 
requirements), or from the nature or design of a product. 
5. Damage to physical assets Natural disaster, terrorism, vandalism 
6. Business disruption & 
system failures 
Losses arising from disruption of business or system failures 
7. Execution, delivery, & 
Process Management 
Losses from failed transaction processing or process management, from 
relations with trade counterparties and vendors 
 
5.2. Basel I 
The BCBS developed their first framework Basel I which set 8% as the minimum capital ratio (i.e. 
capital to risk weighted assets) (BCBS, 2008) as the 1980s Latin American debt crisis, highlighted 
the necessity for safer capital ratios by consolidating capital adequacy measurements for global 
banking systems (BCBS, 2015).  
5.3. Basel II 
In 1999 Basel II, a revised version of Basel I was introduced to rectify the ambiguities identified 
in Basel I (BCBS, 2015), by expanding the “pillar” framework to widen the Basel Accord’s scope, 
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technicality, and magnitudes (Balin, 2008). Basel II is founded on three pillars: Minimum Capital 
Requirements, Supervisory Review, and Market Discipline (BCBS, 2004). 
The minimum capital requirements pillar comprises of three components: the definition of 
regulatory capital, risk-weighted assets, and the minimum ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets 
(Balin, 2008). Banks can develop internal models for assessing their operational risk profile and 
determining the minimum regulatory capital requirements (BCBS, 2011). 
The Supervisory review process, emphasises on the external and internal supervision of the bank’s 
capital adequacy, (Balin, 2008), by ensuring that all past and future operational risk events are 
identified and understood and internal ORM systems are set up to prevent or mitigate their impact 
by being ethical and transparent to banking supervisors (BCBS, 2011; 2014).  
Market discipline encourages disclosures from banks regarding risk exposures, capital, risk 
assessment processes, previously only available to regulators by publicly releasing quarterly 
statistics of the aggregate amounts of surplus capital held, risk-weighted capital sufficiency ratios, 
and credit, market, and operational risk reserves, with details of the bank’s risk reduction methods 
(Tarullo, 2008). Basel II endowed shareholders with the ability to coerce banks to restraint their 
risky activities and their reserve holding approaches (Balin, 2008). Hence, if the risks taken are 
disproportionate to the reserves held then shareholders could penalise the bank. 
Current events and criticism of Basel II have shown a profound need for a modernized Basel 
framework (Crisil 2017) and hence Basel III will be implemented (BCBS, 2015) in 2018. 
5.4. Basel III 
Basel III is a comprehensive set of reform measures, developed by the BCBS to strengthen the 
regulation, supervision, and risk management of the banking sector. (BCBS, 2006; 2010; 2011) 
These measures aim to: improve the banking sector's ability to absorb shocks arising from financial 
Page | 10  
 
and economic stress, (irrespective of the source), improve risk management and governance and 
strengthen banks' transparency and disclosures. (BCBS, 2006; 2010; 2011) The reforms target 
bank-level, or macroprudential, regulation, which will help raise the resilience of individual 
banking institutions to periods of stress and macroprudential or system wide risks that can build up 
across the banking sector as well as the procyclical amplification of these risks over time. (BCBS, 
2006; 2010; 2011) These two approaches are complementary as greater resilience at the individual 
bank level reduces the risk of system wide shocks. (BCBS, 2006) (Appendix- Figure 1) 
6. BNP Paribas - Corporate Profile 
BNP Paribas, headquartered in Paris has service centres and operations in seventy-five countries 
and offers a wide range of banking and financial solutions to individuals, and commercial, 
corporate, and institutional clients It has more than 192,000 employees, based mainly in Belgium, 
France, Italy, and Luxembourg (BNP Paribas, 2015; 2016) and is considered a European leader on 
a global scale, due to its high brand visibility, robust brand name and reputation, that facilitates its 
good financial positioning. The information in the following sections have been compiled and 
summarized from internal procedures books of BNP Paribas and is strictly confidential. 
6.1. Department Overview 
The traineeship belongs to core activity: Corporate and Institutional Banking (CIB), a leader of 
European investment banking (BNP Paribas, 2016). CIB connects the financing needs of corporate 
clients with institutional clients seeking investment opportunities and is organised around 3 
business lines: Corporate Banking; Global Markets; and BNP Paribas Securities Services (BNP 
Paribas, 2016). CIB offers tailor made financial solutions to corporate and institutional clients 
across capital markets, securities services, financing, treasury, and advisory solutions. It provides 
capital market business through the Global Markets (GM) department, comprising of seven global 
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business lines; Forex & Local Markets (FXLM), G10 Rates, Commodity Derivatives (CD), 
Primary Markets, Prime Solutions & Financing (PS&F) Equity Derivatives, and Credit. The GM 
department serves their clients by innovating and using efficient ways of raising and investing 
capital while managing the risk exposure. (Appendix- Figure 2 and Figure 3) 
7. Overview of GM FO OPC & TAC Coordination Team and Process 
The Operational Permanent Control and Transaction Approval Committees team in Lisbon was 
established in 2014 with the main goal of reducing the operational risks faced by GM Front Officers 
by constantly reviewing and approving processes, and creating new procedures and internal 
controls.  Our recognized added value entails- Protection of Profit and Loss by increasing 
operational efficiency, supporting the different Global Business Lines (GBL) in successfully 
adapting to evolving regulatory landscape and ensuring smooth coordination between the GBL’s, 
Functions and Regions. The following processes are for creating awareness, complying with 
governance, and reporting requirements and are in line with conduct requirements and market 
regulations:  
1) Validation Process- The team coordinates the transactions approval and new activities committees 
(TAC & NAC) to ensure adherence to approval policies, business practices and relevant regulations 
along with supporting the Committee Chairperson. It entails performing risk assessments 
encountered by new transactions and activities, to ensure proper implementation of conditions by 
managing ad-hoc business reviews and post implementation follow ups. 
Transactions Approval Committee are exceptional transactions that are non-recurring, outstanding, 
often composite, or structured transactions which are not covered by the bank’s risk policies or 
cannot assimilate to a longstanding and accepted process because of significantly unusual or 
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complex features and hence cannot be handled through the standard approval framework. Such 
transactions must be reviewed and approved through a TAC before they are concluded. 
New Activity Committee are activities that cannot be initiated, monitored, or administered within 
the Bank’s existing and written guidelines, policies, procedures or systems and hence do not fit in 
the current approval framework. It also includes new products and services that must be validated 
through a NAC before being launched. 
The TAC NAC procedures provide a global framework for all business lines dealing with Capital 
Markets and Financing activities within the CIB departments. The validity period for a TAC 
approval is 3 months and 6 months for a NAC. 
2) Risk & Control Assessment- The team’s major responsibility is risk reduction by consistently 
focusing on strengthening the control system by implementing risk reduction methods and practises 
entailing monitoring and analysing past incidents and creating and maintaining a record of potential 
incidents with related action plans. The team monitors and examines recommendations made by 
internal and external auditors regarding business vulnerabilities identified. Risk assessments are 
performed at the Front officer’s level with three main objectives. The first objective is Profit and 
Loss protection entailing identification of operational risk areas, implementing an adequate control 
plan, by designing and upgrading operational risk cartography in with processes, risks, and control 
approaches on both expected and unexpected scenarios, avoiding repetition of past incidents 
thereby reducing the impact on P&L, reputation, and client relationships. The second objective is 
monitoring and allocating regulatory capital through risk sensitive approach and satisfying the 
Basel requirements in terms of Advanced Measurement approach (AMA). The final objective is to 
demonstrate the bank’s sound management of operational risk. 
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3) Profit & Loss protection and Risk Remediation- Focuses on strengthening the front to end control 
set up through the analysis of the operational risk incidents and the determination of risk reduction 
actions by including the respective business lines in answering, following up and closing the 
recommendations made by Internal governance/Audit, Regulatory, Compliance and others. Also 
includes participation and coordination of ad-hoc global remediation plans. Being an important 
procedure for identifying gaps in business level process a separate section has been dedicated to 
the in-depth explanation of operation risk incidents for better understanding. 
4) Regulatory Governance- The team deploys and runs the Governance defined by the bank reforms 
and supervises specific front office processes governance along with coordinating and 
implementing GM & CIB regulatory initiatives.  
5) Control Monitoring and FO supervision- The team oversees materializing, maintaining, and 
improving the FO control plans in dedicated systems, promoting of control related policies and 
assessment of control effectiveness and also performing controls, deploying and running a 
surveillance over FO’s through dedicated task force. 
8. Operational Risk Management Framework 
The purpose of the framework is providing Senior Management with a view of the operational risk 
profile as per GBL’s or Regions by enabling a risk based approach to be applied to the whole of 
GM activities and design a risk mapping based on the operational risk library. It also includes 
complying with AMA and non-AMA methodologies by designing Remediation Actions for all 
identified risk areas. The framework includes the following:  
1) Risk Identification and Remediation- A Standard set of operational risk scenarios are identified 
and evaluated across each of the GBL’s. 
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2) Assessment and Measurement-Operational risk is assessed across each business area to provide an 
aggregated GM wide view of operational risk. 
3) Management and Monitoring- The operational monitoring template incorporates a risk based 
approach where if the severity of the risk exceeds the articulated risk appetite the bank considers 
enhancing the control framework. 
4) Reporting and MI- Results from operational risk assessments area escalated as part of the MI packs 
to the senior management to ensure they have visibility over the GM Operational risk profiles 
5) Reviewing and Updating- The operational risk assessment is dynamic as they are reviewed and 
updated on a regular basis depending on the severity of the risk scenarios identified. Risk 
assessments are reviewed yearly or whenever a significant change in the activity warrants it. 
9. Operational Risk Cartography/ Mapping 
The effort to identify and assess risks is at the heart of the permanent operational control approach; 
it is a dynamic process that justifies the implemented system for mitigating risk while also feeding 
on the information provided by this same system. The major steps of the risk mapping are:  
1) The identification of the key risk areas, par event type and regulatory requirements 
2) The analysis and the assessment of the underlying risks, for assessing the criticality of the main 
areas of intrinsic risk exposure. The underlying risk does not aim at assessing risk without any 
control framework, but rather the level of intrinsic risk to which an activity or a process is exposed 
3) The analysis of the actual functioning of the control system is intended to assess the quality of the 
measures implemented for reducing the level of the underlying risk 
4) The analysis of dynamic risk indicators is intended to assess the current or future distortions relative 
to the normal operating situation for the control system 
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5) The residual risk, provides an assessment of the risk having considered the actual functioning of 
the control framework and the results in terms of risks it gives at a given point of time  
6) The underlying risk, the actual risk framework, the dynamic indicators, and the residual risk are 
subject to a rating that aims to synthesize the analysis.  
The overall analysis process is guided by different elements that must be considered to make the 
rating as objective as possible. Operational risk mapping aims to recognise the pivotal areas of 
fundamental risks the entity is exposed to, assessing the residual risk, following the consideration 
of the actual permanent control framework and indicators of dynamic risk. Risk mapping facilitates 
a methodical approach towards operational risk management through identification, assessment, 
monitoring/reporting, and control/mitigation (BCBS, 2003). Risk mapping helps in formalizing 
and disclosing identified operational risks in a transparent manner thereby helping the bank to take 
corrective actions thus rectifying potential weaknesses. Appendix Figure 2 
10. Operational Risk Incidents 
An Operational Risk Incident is an actual event arising from the inadequacy or failure of internal 
processes, or from external events, which has led, may lead to a loss, gain, opportunity cost, near-
miss or P&L timing. Scenarios of internal and external processes are listed below: 
 
A loss or gain are unexpected negative or positive impacts obtained through a failure or inadequacy 
of the process or arising from external events. For example, an error in the hedging a position that 
later exposed the position to a loss or a wrong placement of trade that later resulted in a profit. 




•Non-compliance with regulatory obligations
Failure of External Processes
•A natural disaster, accident or assault
•An external fraud
•Default of an external service provider
•A lawsuit
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A near-miss is an unforeseen or unplanned event that had the potential but did not cause an impact 
or has not occurred as the result of favourable circumstances, or was recovered within a short time 
of 7 calendar days. For example, an IT application was down for several minutes which could have 
led to a financial impact. 
An opportunity cost is the benefit of the option given up when selecting a different one. Thus, in 
investment it is the difference between the return of the selected investment and the one passed up. 
A P&L timing incident does not have any financial impact but is caused by an event that results in 
delayed payment or inflow of an asset. 
An operational risk incident is primarily an event that must be characterized as analytically as 
possible, while adhering to the framework set by the Basel regulations. The Basel regulations 
identified seven event types, broken down on two levels. Within the BNP Paribas group, this level 
has been refined by adding a third qualification level that makes it possible to define a uniform set 
of events, thereby improving the analysis and decision capacities. (Appendix- Figure 5) An 
operational risk incident is defined by the "cause - event - effect" link. (Appendix- Figure 6) 
Analysing the cause of an incident is an essential part of managing and preventing operational 
risks. A nomenclature of causes has been defined on the group level to guide the analysis and to 
allow for consolidations. This analysis serves to identify the entity or entities at fault, as well as the 
faulty process or processes. The identification of the faulty processes is mandatory for any incident 
higher than the collection threshold. Monitoring and reporting incidents, makes it easier to evaluate 
if the purpose of the ORM, to reduce the effects of the unfavourable events is being met. 
It is the duty of all employees of the BNP Paribas Group to report an operational risk incident, to 
his/her hierarchy and the OPC team by providing clear, concise and accurate information regarding 
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the incident. The superior, or the employee specialized in operational risk in the team, analyses the 
event in compliance with the entity’s rules, and declares the incident whenever necessary. 
There are two main reporting tools for incidents for internal purposes- APHI and FORECAST. In 
APHI all operational incidents that occur globally are logged daily. If the incident results in a loss, 
gain, opportunity cost or near-miss above the amount of € 10k for any internal process failure or 
external event or € 0 for any fraud, breach of market regulation or sanction must be reported in 
FORECAST. Incidents reported in FORECAST are evaluated by IG, Internal and external auditors, 
Regulators and hence should be inserted within 3 days in cases of fraud and 10 days for other 
incidents which need to be closed within 6 months.  
Example of hypothetical incidents reported on APHI and FORECAST: 
1) IT Incident- Production database outage impacted morning trading in Asia with certain applications 
needing to be restarted for reconnection resulting in loss of € 20k due to loss of order priority in 
future rolls and late participation in Asian option market. 
2) Trading Incident- Middle Office P&L team did not perform accurate checks on a registered trade 
to ensure that it has a flat cash position on a daily basis along with incorrect traded booked of T 
date which were only discovered on T+5 days and the incorrect traded where hedged with profit of 
€ 200k. (Appendix- Figure 7 and Figure 8) 
11.  Recommendations 
Following the identification of a failure or inefficiency of the permanent control system, by 
Inspection Générale, Supervisory Authority, Statutory Auditors, Management or an independent 
controlling function, the Management must ensure that recommendations that have been defined 
and validated are correctly implemented within the deadlines. In the absence of recommendations, 
determining whether actions are necessary and, making sure that they are correctly implemented, 
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in all cases, should be incorporated in the mapping of risks. These finding are analysed in the light 
of the (actual or potential) risk incurred and in a manner consistent with the existing risk mapping. 
This risk mapping must (if necessary) be updated, in terms of the underlying risk, the control 
system, and the residual risk. 
12.  Development of an Internal Control System 
To protect from Operational Risk, BNPP Global Markets has implemented an Internal Control 
Framework based on the articulation of three lines of defence, split between Permanent & Periodic 
Control (Appendix- Figure 9). OPC falls within the first line of defence in which controls are 
generally exhaustive in nature and are required for the operational processes and risks. Internal 
controls are typically embedded in a bank’s day-to-day business and are designed to ensure, to the 
extent possible, that bank activities are efficient and effective, information is reliable, timely and 
complete and the bank is compliant with applicable laws and regulation. 
The basic definition of “control” refers to “any measure taken by the management, the Board and 
other parties to manage the risks and increase the probability that the stated aims and objectives 
will be reached”. A “control plan” is defined as an organized set of controls that are to be carried 
out and that cover all an entity’s specific processes, as well as processes shared with or delegated 
by another entity. The OPC team oversees the designing, creation, implementation, and 
improvements of the control plans. The control plans should be consistent for all GBL’s and regions 
and must conform to the practices, policies, guidelines, etc. For creating an effective control, 
analysing, and measuring the organization’s risk exposure is essential (Scandizzo, 2005). The 
intensity of the control must be proportionate to the risk, and the entity’s risk tolerance level. The 
objective of a control is to prevent a risk or to limit its impact through early detection. A control is 
necessarily linked to a risk, irrespective of its nature. In practical terms, the set-up of a control 
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results from an analysis of the risks facing the entity. The greater the risk, the greater the intensity 
of the control. If the risk embedded in an operation or a process is assessed as low and acceptable, 
the control can be limited to a self-control carried out by the person performing the operation or 
process. The higher the significance of the risk, the more additional controls over and above a 
simple self-control must be implemented, involving other employees, the management, or a 
dedicated team (1st level control) and/or independent permanent control functions (2nd level 
control). A control is considered key (or major) when it covers a major risk, i.e. the occurrence of 
which would have a significant effect on the results, assets, or reputation of the Group or one of its 
entities. The identification of the controls comprising an entity’s control plan must follow a 
systematic analysis approach for the risks related to each process for which the entity is responsible. 
It should rely on a risk mapping exercise and be consistent in entities using the AMA, with the 
quantified potential incidents. For the system to maintain its full effectiveness, while ensuring the 
proper involvement of the management, the number of major controls within a generic control plan, 
and overall, on the entity level, must remain limited and therefore be determined very selectively. 
For developing effective controls, meetings are scheduled with all teams to receive explanations 
regarding their processes on a deeper and more comprehensive level to recognize the potential 
operational risks that are posed to the bank. Once the potential risks have been analysed and 
mapped, internal controls are developed with the objective of bridging the gap to mitigate or 
possibly eliminate these risks. The following process descriptions and controls are generic 
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12.1. Hypothetical Trading and Structuring Teams 
Trading teams offer a range of standardized products at competitive prices to both retail and 
institutional clients daily. Traders develop defined strategies by after deliberating over certain 
factors like the margins, duration of trade, payoff, the underlying, quantities and others and set 
specific parameters when offering new products. 
Structuring teams develop customized products to address the meet the complex needs of the clients 
and satisfy the requirements of the bank Since structured products are tailor-made investment 
strategies it is imperative that they understand how to appropriately price the products created in 
order to handle volatility and different market environments. Below are the control plans designed 
specifically for each team. 
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Table 1: Hypothetical Trading Team’s Control Plan 
 
# Control name Risk Involved Control objective 
Test 
frequency 




Misexecution Front officers must assess and escalate instances where the actual or contemplated 
operation of an Automated Trading Strategy has or may negatively impact a client 
and/or the bank, such impact has or may result in financial or reputational harm, and 
such harm is or may be material. 
Daily 




Front Officers and Supervisors must acknowledge that they have personally complied 
with BNPP Client confidentiality guidelines, followed the Code Name Policy when 
communicating about flow and market color, and NOT shared information with persons 
who do not "need to know" such information for a valid business purpose. 
Daily 
3 Control on KYC 
and on compliance 
restrictions 
(Financial 
Sanction, CSR, …) 
against instruments 










Front officers and managers ensure that they comply with the KYC Policy and with 
Compliance restrictions (including Restricted List, CSR Policy and Sanctions / 
embargoes.) Before pricing a trade, Front Officers ensure that the instrument or the 
underlying instrument is not on the Global Financial Security sanctions list (information 
available in Guard) and not on the Compliance Restricted / Black List. 
 Before trading with a counterparty, Front Officers must check that the appropriate KYC 
and relevant flags are in place (in CRM Lite or CRDSweb) and that no restrictions such 
as financial sanctions apply to the counterparty (information available in Guard or 
CRMLite). 
Daily 





Front Officers and Supervisors must ensure that all trades they personnally instigated or 
booked are booked during their work day. 
Daily 




Internal Fraud Supervisors and/or Front Officers must ensure that all necessary approvals (including 
TAC / NAC and ET - Exceptional Transactions) have been obtained prior to trading or 
prior to starting a new activity and that all required conditions have been satisfied by 
their respective deadlines. 
Monthly 
6 Control on trader 
and desk mandates 
sign-off 
Rogue Trading Front Officers must sign off on his / her trading mandate(s), and Supervisors must sign-
off on his / her desk mandate(s), on their annual anniversary and in the event of 
significant modification. 
Annually 
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Table 2: Hypothetical Structuring Team’s Control Plan 
# Control name Risk Involved Control objective 
Test 
frequency 
1 Control on 
Automated Trading 
Strategies red flags 
Misexecution Front officers must assess and escalate instances where the actual or contemplated 
operation of an Automated Trading Strategy has or may negatively impact a client 
and/or the bank, such impact has or may result in financial or reputational harm, and 
such harm is or may be material. 
Daily 




Front Officers and Supervisors must acknowledge that they have personally complied 
with BNPP Client confidentiality guidelines, followed the Code Name Policy when 
communicating about flow and market colour, and NOT shared information with 
persons who do not "need to know" such information for a valid business purpose. 
Daily 





Front Officers and Supervisors must ensure that all trades they personally instigated or 
booked are booked during their work day. 
Daily 
4 Control on 
operational risk 
incident escalation 
Internal Fraud Front Officers and Supervisors must ensure that any operational risk incident they are 
aware of has been properly reported to their Manager and to the GM OPC team and 
that appropriate actions have been taken. 
Weekly 




Internal Fraud Supervisors and/or Front Officers must ensure that all necessary approvals (including 
TAC / NAC and ET - Exceptional Transactions) have been obtained prior to trading or 
prior to starting a new activity and that all required conditions have been satisfied by 
their respective deadlines. 
Monthly 
6 Control on trader 
and desk mandates 
sign-off 
Rogue Trading Front Officers must sign off on his / her trading mandate(s), and Supervisors must 
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13.  Control Monitoring and Front Officer Supervision 
ARIS Architect & Business Designer (ABD), is an internal tool used for creating, managing, 
analysing, and administering the control plan models of front officers and their teams. After 
completing the modelling in ABD, the control plans are then imported onto the application ARCM 
(ARIS Risk and Compliance Manager), commonly called ORUS FO. ARCM is an application used 
by front officers for viewing and validating their controls, or reporting any operational risks 
encountered while executing their daily tasks. ARCM also allows for a two- way communication 
between Front Officers and OPC team, where the OPC can inform the Front Officer of any potential 
risks arising due to incompletion of certain tasks through the specific controls and the comment 
sent by the OPC team is called “Pre-assessment”. A “Pre-assessment” risk level is inserted by 
selecting either the red, orange, or green colour to signify that the risk of not performing the task 
is high, medium, or low respectively. This helps in early detection and aversion of potential 
operational risks. Thus, ARCM plays a significant role in effectively managing, controlling, and 
mitigating potential risks. 
14.  Conclusion 
Within the NOVA Work Project Direct Internship Programme, the scope of this empirical study, 
involved performance of an internal analysis of the processes performed by the BNP Paribas Global 
Markets Front Office team to infer the effectiveness of having a robust operational risk 
management framework. Prominent operational risk incidents, like the rogue trading activities at 
Barings Bank, Société Générale, UBS, and lack of controls at Nordea, highlight the severe financial 
impacts caused by not implementing robust, effective, and efficient ORM frameworks. In 
hindsight, early identification of these incidents could have significantly reduced the financial 
impact to the minimum or could have possibly been negligible. Thus, drawing attention to the 
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existence of standardized and structural drivers within the organisation’s environment that caused 
their insolvency.  
These leads to the conclusion that, misconducts are not isolated events occurring due the sole 
activities of an individual with a financial institution. As demonstrated by the LIBOR scandal, the 
origins may initially be trivial but can intensify to cause a global financial crisis due to unethical 
ways of conducting business. This empirical work concludes that, robust, and effective ORM 
systems are vital in helping financial institutions in depicting the probable impacts of identified 
operational risks but also in preventing the massive negative impacts through spillage into the 
financial markets. 
To conclude the establishment of a first line of defence that is both systematic and effective is of 
vital importance for the early detection of potential risks and subsequent mitigation or avoidance 
of its impact on financial institutions. As a result, to protect the financial, reputational, and/or 
operational stability from the negative impacts of unfavourable and unanticipated events defensive 
measures need to be taken against possible risks.  
A complete risk-free environment is difficult to achieve, therefore developing and implementing a 
customized and comprehensive ORM framework should be of vital importance to all financial 
institutions. Therefore, the Work Project’s research process focuses on BNP Paribas’ development 
of a risk cartography, designing and implementing of internal control systems to combat the 
potential risks. 
This empirical study has meaningful contributions to the literature and the business world, since to 
the best of our knowledge this work project provides a thorough insight into BNP Paribas’ ORM 
systems. This work project provides a unique and insightful elucidation on the internal processes 
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of developing control plans through risk mapping and a concise view of implementing these control 
plans through internal system.  
Due to confidentiality reasons, the main limitation of this research was caused by the restrictions 
on sensitive information and internal data, thus a more detailed insight could not be providing that 
would further enrich the study. Another consideration for further research could the one that 
explores into the quantitative characteristics of ORM with the help of the bank’s internal data. 
Furthermore, the implementation of Basel III, would demand changed in the ORM framework and 
thus, it would be interesting if the following researches would highlight the effect these changes 
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